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INTRODUCTION

This article compares and contrasts two similar but unfamiliar
cases decided in western Massachusetts, Westfield Chemical Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp. 1 and Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp.2 Westfield
and Black are typical of a certain genre of disputes that has developed
• Partner, Bigelow & SaItzberg, Woburn, Massachusetts. Member, Computer Law
Association. B.A. Boston University, 1969; M.B.A. Boston University, 1973; J.D. Suffolk
University, 1976.
.. Associate, Bigelow & Saltzberg, Woburn, Massachusetts. A.B. Brown Univer
sity, 1975; J.D. Suffolk University (cum laude), 1982.
I. 21 UCC Rep. Servo 1293, [1977] 6 COMPo L. SERVo REP. 438 (Mass. Sup. Ct.).
The full text of the agreements signed by the parties are set forth in 6 C.L.S.R. at 445-452.
The judge was John M. Greaney, now Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
2. No. 78-30777-F (D. Mass. December 18, 1981) (also a slip opinion on Lexis). The
judge was Frank M. Freedman, United States District Judge, District of Massachusetts.
529
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in recent y~ars: the computer contract case. 3 In the typical computer
contract case, the plaintiff is a small business which purchases (or
leases) a computer system under a written agreement and the defend
ant is the seller and manufacturer of the computer system. 4 When the
computer does not work as expected and the user sues, the causes of
action generally sound in contract (breach of warranty) and tort
(misrepresentation).
Burroughs was a defendant in these two cases and has been in
volved in many such cases. 5 Burroughs, however, is certainly not the
only computer vendor which has experienced this type of litigation. 6
3. Since neither Westfield nor Black is reported in the West System, the full text of
each is reprinted in ApPENDIX A and ApPENDIX B of this article.
4. See text accompanying note 3.
5. See, e.g., Badger Bearing v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wisc. 1977);
Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1981), affd, 681
F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1982); Burroughs Corp. v. Century Steel, Inc., 99 Nev. 464, 664 P.2d
354 (1983); Burroughs Corp. v. Hall Affiliates, 423 So.2d 1348 (Ala. 1982); Burroughs
Corp. v. Macon Rubber Co., 154 Ga. App. 322 (1980); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Bur
roughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Chesapeake Petroleum Supply Co. v.
Burroughs Corp., [1977] 6 CoMP. L. SERVo REP. 768, No. 40267 (Maryland), affd on other
grounds, 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d 734 (1978); Earman Oil CO. V. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1980); Edwin Pearl, Inc. V. Burroughs Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 1031,468 N.E.2d
700 (1984); Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., No. C-84-0523-WWS
(N.D. Cal., September 19, 1984); Hi Neighbor Enterprises, Inc. V. Burroughs Corp., 492 F.
Supp. 823 (N.D. Fla. 1980); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39
(D.S.C. 1974); Iten Leasing CO. V. Burroughs Corp., 684 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1982); Kalil
Bottling Co. V. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. App. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (1980); Loveley V.
Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557 (1974); Quad County Distributing Co., Inc.
V. Burroughs Corp., 68 Ill. App. 3d 163 (1979); Reimer Meat Products, Inc. v. Burroughs
Corp., 96 Wisc. 2d 737, 293 N.W.2d 184 (1980); Rochester Welding Supply Corp. V. Bur
roughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1980); Sullivans of Liberty, Inc. V. Bur
roughs Corp., 57 A.D.2d 664, 393 N.Y.S.2d 626 (3rd Dept. 1977); Sun 'n Fun Stores, Inc.
V. Burroughs Corp., No. 79-2450-MA (D. Mass. 1982); Suntogs of Miami, Inc. V. Bur
roughs Corp., 433 So. 2d 581 (Fla. App. 1983); Tilden Financial Corp. V. Palo Tire Servo V.
Burroughs Corp., 596 F.2d 604 (3rd Cir. 1979); U.S. Welding, Inc. V. Burroughs Corp.,
587 F. Supp. 49 (D. Col. 1984); Walter E. Heller & CO. V. Burroughs Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d
213, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (1977); W.R. Weaver V. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Texas
1979).
6. See. e.g., The Glovatorium, Inc. V. National Cash Register Corp., 684 F.2d 658
(9th Cir. 1982); Conway Publications v. Data Gen. Corp., No. C82-1862A (N.D. Ga.,
August 17, 1983); IBM v. Catamore, 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976); Dunn Appraisal V.
Honeywell Information Sys., 687 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1982); Accusystems, Inc. v. Honeywell
Information Sys., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Computer Sys. Engineering, Inc.
V. Qantel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Mass. 1983), affd, 740 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1984);
Diversified Environments, Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 461 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Pa. 1978);
Teamsters Security Fund of Northern California V. Sperry Rand Corp., [1976] 6 COMPo L.
SERVo REP. 951 (N.D. Cal.).

PERFORMANCE CLAIMS

1985]

531

Both Black and Westfield are summary judgment opinions. 7 In
many of these cases, the summary judgment hearing is dispositive be
cause the standard form agreement bars the introduction of testimo
nial evidence that varies or contradicts the carefully drafted language
of the vendor or lessor's form agreement, leaving no issues of fact to be
determined. In both Black and Westfield,·Burroughs moved for sum
mary judgment on all contract and tort issues. 8 In both cases, the
contract issues were decided in favor of the computer vendor at the
summary judgment hearing. 9 Summary judgment with respect to the
tort claims, however, was granted in Westfield lO and denied in Black. II
There is no indication of any subsequent proceeding in the Westfield
case. Presumably the plaintiff did not appeal, but may have reached a
settlement with Burroughs after summary judgment was granted.
Before trial on the tort counts, the Black case was settled.

II.
A.

THE CLAIMS AND THE RULINGS

Westfield Chemical Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.

In Westfield, the plaintiff was a disgruntled purchaser of a Bur
roughs computer system. The action was in five counts: (1) breach of
Burroughs' express warranty that the computer system would gener
ate efficiency and time savings and was fit for plaintiffs accounting
system; 12 (2) breach of contract with plaintiff to develop, maintain,
and service the system; 13 (3) breach of the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular use;14 (4) negligent manufacture of the proposed sys
tem;15 and (5) fraudulent inducement. 16
The court entered summary judgment for the defendant on all
counts.
In disposing of counts 1 and 3, the court first noted that the de
fendant's standard written equipment sales contract and application
software supported the contract as executed by the plaintiff and dis
claimed the implied and express warranties which the plaintiff claimed
7.

See supra note 3. Subsequent page citations to Westfield and Black will refer to
and ApPENDIX B infra pages 548-570.
Black, ApPENDIX B, at 554; Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 548.
See Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 553; Black, ApPENDIX B at 554.
Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 553.
Black, ApPENDIX B at 569.
Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 548.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 549.

ApPENDIX A

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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had been breached. 17 The court also found the disclaimers were con
spicuous. IS Furthermore, the court concluded the standard agreement
limitation of damages against the vendor was proper. 19 Finally, the
court ruled that the limited remedy provided under Burroughs' stan
dard contract did not fail of its essential purpose. 20
With respect to count 2, the plaintiff alleged only that there had
been delays in the providing of maintenance by the defendant; plaintiff
did not allege that the defendant had failed to supply the quality of
maintenance for which the parties had contracted. The court ruled,
therefore, that Burroughs had not breached its maintenance contract
which provided that it would not be liable for damages or losses in
providing maintenance. 21 The court then granted the defendant sum
mary judgment on count 2.22
With respect to count 4, the court ruled that the plaintiff's claim
for negligent manufacture of the system was duplicative of the war
ranty and contract counts. 23
Finally, the court disposed of count 5, in which the plaintiff al
leged it had been fraudulently induced to purchase the defendant's sys
tem. The plaintiff contended there was a statement in Burroughs' pre
sales proposal which claimed plaintiff would experience substantial
man-hour savings from the system. The court held that this misrepre
sentation could not have been made by the sales representative with
personal knowledge. 24 Such a statement, therefore, could not have
been made with fraudulent intent.25 The plaintiff, according to Judge
Greaney, could not have reasonably relied on this misrepresentation. 26
Moreover, evidence of the misrepresentation was excluded by the en
tire contract clause of the parties' agreement.
B.

Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp.
In Black, the plaintiff was a Massachusetts business trust engaged
17.

Id.

18.
19.

Id.

Id. The court determined that where the loss is commercial, as in the present
case, limitation of damages is not prima Jacie unconscionable, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 2-719(3) (West 1958). The court then found the limitation of damages proper.
Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 549-50.
20. [d. at 550.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 553.
24. Id. at 550-52.
25. Id. at 551.
26. Id. at 552.
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in the wholesale distribution of newspapers, magazines, and paperback
books.27 It purchased a computer system from Burroughs with which
to operate this business. 28 The promised software, however, was never
fully delivered. Black's complaint contained three counts: (1) breach
of contract;29 (2) knowing and willful violation of the Massachusetts
Consumer Protection Act;30 and (3) tortious misrepresentation. 31 The
court ~ranted Burroughs' motion for summary judgment under count
13 2 but denied the motion with respect to counts 233 and 3. 34
In its breach of contract claim, plaintiff raised two issues: (1) that
defendant anticipatorily breached its contractual obligations;3s and
(2) that the exclusive remedies provisions of the contract between the
parties did not contemplate the nature of breach present in this case
and, therefore, failed of their essential purpose. 36 As the court noted,
however, the plaintiff did not cite any instance in which the defendant
made an unequivocal declaration of its intent not to perform. 37 More
over, the contract as originally signed had been amended to extend the
time for Burroughs to perform to a later date than the date of the
initiation of the action. 38 Citing decisions from other courts, the Black
court also pointed out that the defendant's standard form contracts
were valid and enforceable. 39
With respect to count 3, the court found that the defendant had
superior knowledge of the capabilities of its hardware and software
products40 and that in such a situation representations of future events
may be actionable. Hence, there were sufficient material issues of fact
to preclude summary judgment.41
Finally, with respect to the plaintiff's Chapter 93A claim, the
court denied summary judgment and rejected the defendant's claim
27. Black, ApPENDIX B at 554.
28. [d. at 555.
29. [d. at 556.
30. [d. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A (West 1958 & Supp. 1984).
31. Black, ApPENDIX B at 557.
32. [d. at 569.
33. [d.
34. [d. Note that Judge Freedman also allowed the plaintiff to add a fourth count
for negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 554, 567-68.
35. [d. at 560.
36. [d.
37. [d. at 562.
38. [d.
39. [d. at 563.
40. [d. at 564.
41. [d. at 564-65.
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that the action was exempt from the Consumer Protection ACt. 42

III.

CONTRACT ISSUES

Three clauses are found in practically every computer equipment
sales agreement: 43 (1) the manufacturer warrants the equipment to be
free from defects in material or workmanship for a period of time
(usually less than one year); (2) the manufacturer disclaims all other
warranties, express or implied, including but not limited to the implied
warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose; and
(3) the written agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the
customer and seller with respect to the equipment and related services
to be furnished, and the written agreement supersedes all prior com
munications between the parties, including all oral and written
proposals.
The combined effect of the three clauses has been, in many cases,
to eliminate almost any chance of a successful claim for breach of ex
press or implied warranties. The first provides that the manufacturer
will service any defective equipment for the period of the warranty.
The second and third clauses provide that the manufacturer does not
warrant the performance or capacity of the computer system. The
third clause makes inadmissible any oral or written statements not
within the four corners of the agreement or incorporated therein by
specific reference. This so-called merger clause takes advantage of the
parol evidence rule44 to exclude sales literature or sales talk that might
otherwise be found to create an express warranty. Such clauses have
been held to shield computer vendors entirely from warranty liability
for computer systems that do not work as expected. 45
42. Id. at 565-67. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A § 3 (West 1958 & Supp.
1984) which states:
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to transactions or actions otherwise per
mitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under
statutory authority of the commonwealth or of the United States.
For the purpose of this section, the burden of proving exemptions from the
provision of this chapter shall be upon the person claiming the exemptions.
Id.
43. For a discussion of computer equipment sales agreements, see Gordon & Starr,
Software Development Contracts and Consulting Arrangements: A Structure for Enforce
ability and Practicality, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 487, 493-505 (1985).
44. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-202 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984).
45. In addition to Black and Westfield. see Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625
F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39
(D.S.C. 1974); Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md.
1981), affd, 681 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1982) (express warranty did not include printed circuit
boards which the court classified as expendable parts).
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One method of attacking these clauses is to claim that the dis
claimers are unconscionable, in violation of Uniform Commercial
Code section 2-302(1).46
A.

Unconscionability

In Westfield, Judge Greaney concluded that the agreement was
not unconscionable because the contract was between businessmen
who presumably acted at arm's length. 47 There was no indication in
the opinion that the court had any evidence before it as to the com
mercial setting, or the purpose and effect of the agreement, on which it
could consider the unconscionability of the contract. Uniform Com
mercial Code Section 2-302(2)48 provides, however, that a court
should afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present such evi
dence when it is claimed, or appears to the court, that the contract, or
any clause thereof, may be unconscionable. The existence of an issue
of unconscionability has been found to preclude the granting of sum
mary judgment.49
In Black, Judge Freedman cited both Westfield and Earman Oil
Co., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. so for the proposition that the Burroughs
standard form sales agreements were not unconscionable. There was,
however, no discussion in the opinion of commercial setting, purpose,
and effect.
In Earman Oil, Judge Brown, after discussing some of the criteria
for finding unconscionability, ruled that the contract was not uncon
sionable. In a footnote, however, he suggested that the district court
had invited counsel to present evidence concerning the question of un
46. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978) Provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause
as to avoid any unconscionable result.

Id.
47. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 550.
48. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1978) provides:
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court
in making the determination.
Id.
49. Electronics Corp. of Am. v. Lear Jet Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 1066,286 N.Y.S.2d 711
(1967) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-302 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984»; Reynolds v.
Preferred Mutual Insurance Co., 49 Mass. App. Dec. 97 (1972), [1972] 11 U.C.C. REP.
SERVo 701; see Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Pratt, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 537,278 A.2d 154 (1971).
50. 625 F.2d 1291,1299-1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
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conscionability, but no such evidence was presented. Judge Brown re
lied on Potomac Electric Power Company v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp. 51 for the criteria by which a court will determine the existence of
unconscionability. The five criteria are: (1) examination ofthe negoti
ation process as to length of time in dealing; (2) the length of time for
deliberations; (3) the experience or astuteness of the parties;
(4) whether counsel reviewed the contract; and (5) whether the buyer
was a reluctant purchaser. 52 Applying those criteria, Judge Brown
found there was no evidence to show that the contract as executed
between Earman Oil and Burroughs was unconscionable. He imposed
a rebuttable presumption of arm's length dealings in commercial set
tings, however, saying that a standard form contract such as Bur
roughs', as executed by a business person in a commercial setting, is
presumed to be conscionable unless proven otherwise. Judge Freed
man in Black appears to cite Westfield for the proposition that the
presumption is conclusive, which is inconsistent with both the Uni
form Commercial Code and Earman Oil:
. . . I note that Black has not challenged the terms and conditions
of the Burroughs standard forms on the basis of unconscionability,
and the precedents cited by Burroughs suggest that such a challenge
would be fruitless. 53

The authors suggest that if Judge Greaney in Westfield and Judge
Freedman in Black had had the benefit of a full factual investigation
and full briefing on the issue, the more reasoned approach by Judge
Brown in Earman Oil would likely have emerged.
In several non-computer cases in other jurisdictions, the pre
sumption of conscionability has been overcome. 54
The unconscionability issue was also raised in at least one prior
computer contract case. In The Glovatorium, Inc. v. National Cash
Register Corp., 55 Judge William W. Schwarzer, in the course of a hear
ing on motion for judgment non obstante veredicto on May 1, 1981,
stated:
I think this is perhaps a classic case of protecting a purchaser
51. 385 F. Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 527 F.2d
853 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
52. Id. at 579. See also Earman Oil, 625 F.2d at 1299.
53. Black, ApPENDIX B at 560.
54. Frank's Maintenance and Engineering, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d
980, 408 N.E.2d 403 (1980), Industralease Automated & Scientific Equipment Corp. v.
R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 482,396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977), Butcher v. Gar
rett-Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978).
55. No. C79-3393WWS (N.D. Cal.), affd, 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982).
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against this kind of contract, of the necessity of protecting a pur
chaser who is innocent of an appreciation of the consequence of a
deficiency.
In the first place he relies on the reputation of NCR and its
experience, its competence, the fact that it's been making computers
for a long time and surely knows what it's doing and has a substan
tial organization to back it up. All of those things would lead a
purchaser to put his trust in NCR, and certainly in this case, the
purchaser was induced to do that. So. . . and induced to do so
erroneously, under circumstances that support a finding offraud, on
the basis of misleading incorrect information.
But aside from that. The second branch of the-of this analy
sis is that a purchaser who has no experience in computers doesn't
have any inkling of-how wrong these things can go, and this case
is a good demonstration of what it can do to a business when it
doesn't work properly, and the fact that even though you're dealing
with a huge company, with enormous experience, that doesn't give
you any assurance that they are going to be able to remedy the de
fects in their products.
So it seems to me if there is ever a reason for holding that these
provisions in these contracts should not be enforced because of un
conscionability, this is the a-number one case. S6

Westfield has been cited by B1ack,S7 Earman Oil,s8 and W.R.
Weaver v. Burroughs Corp. S9 as authority for the proposition that Bur

roughs' standard form agreement has not been shown to be uncon
scionable. As noted above, however, Uniform Commercial Code
section 2-302 provides that such a proposition is subject to a factual
examination. 60 The logical result is that the issue of unconscionabil
ity, once it is raised, must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The
existence of such an issue should, therefore, preclude the grant of sum
mary judgment, unless the party alleging unconscionability is unable
to present credible evidence of the commercial setting, purpose, and
effect of the standard form agreement.

56. N. Cohen, 1 Computer Law Reporter I, 149·150 (July 1982) (transcript). See
also Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co. v. Burroughs Corp., [1977] 6 CoMP. L. SERVo
REP., (Callaghan) 768, 769, affd on other grounds, 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d 734 (1978)
(unconscionability rendered disclaimers ineffective).
57. Black, ApPENDIX B at 560.
58. Earman Oil, 625 F.2d at 1300.
59. 580 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Texas 1979).
60. See supra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
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Limitation of Remedies

If the disappointed computer buyer overcomes the hurdles of the
disclaimers of warranty and their presumed conscionability so as to
state a cause of action for breach of warranty, the next issue is whether
the warranty was breached. Usually, the vendor warrants that it will
repair or replace an item of equipment found defective within the war
ranty period. 61 When a vendor cannot make the computer system
work and the equipment itself is free from defects in material or work
manship, the warranty can be said to fail of its essential purpose. The
limited warranty of repair or replacement of a defective piece of equip
ment may be no solution to the problem. In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v.
National Cash Register Corp.,62 the court stated, "Because NCR never
furnished four of the six promised functions, their attempted limita
tion of remedy failed of its essential purpose. CSI was therefore de
prived of the substantial value of its bargain."63
When the court reaches the conclusion that the essential purposes
of the remedy failed, UCC section 2-719(2)64 comes into play. One of
the remedies otherwise available under the UCC is the recovery of
consequential damages, which is exactly what the disappointed buyer
is seeking.
Section 2-719(3)65 of the Uniform Commercial Code expressly
authorizes the limitation of consequential damages unless the limita
tion is unconscionable. Such a limitation is presumably unconsciona
ble in consumer transactions, and presumably conscionable in
commercial loss cases. 66 Pursuant to UCC section 2-714(2),67 the
buyer would be entitled to its benefit of the bargain damages (the dif
ference, at the time and place of acceptance, between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as
61. See Gordon & Starr, supra note 43 at 497.
62. 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.]. 1979), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 670 F.2d
1304 (3rd Cir. 1982).
63. 479 F. Supp. at 745.
64. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978) provides: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this
Code." Id.
65. U.c.c. § 2-719(3) (1978) provides: "Consequential damages may be limited or
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconsciona
ble but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not." Id.
66. Id.
67. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1978) provides: "The measure of damages for breach of war
ranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods
accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special
circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount." Id.
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warranted), unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a
different amount. 68 Generally, the upper limit ofUCC section 2-714(2)
damages is the contract price plus incidental damages. 69 There are,
however, situations where the benefit of the bargain could exceed the
contract price. 70
In Westfield, the court did not address the "failure of essential
purpose" issue. In Black, Judge Freedman acknowledged that there
are cases "where a limited repair and replacement remedy essentially
eviscerates a contract of its substance,"71 but held Black was not such
a case.72 The time for Burroughs' performance was November 1,
1978. Black, however, cancelled the agreements in August 1978,
before Burrough's performance was finally due. Black's claim of an
ticipatory repudiation failed. "Nevertheless, the exclusive and limited
remedies of the AES [Agreement for Equipment Sale] and SSA
[Software and Support Agreement] could not have failed oftheir es
sential purpose before they even became applicable. "73
IV.
A.

THE ISSUE

OF

FRAUD

Overview

In the typical computer system acquisition case, the computer
purchaser or lessee, unless it has great economic bargaining power,
will have to execute the computer vendor's standard form purchase or
lease contracts. Although the purchaser or lessee may succeed in get
ting the vendor to amend some parts of its standard forms, the con
tract normally will continue to contain the standard disclaimer of
warranties and limitations of liabilities provisions discussed above. In
this case, as we have seen, the user's actions for breach of contract in
the event of default by the vendor can be extremely limited. If the user
is able to include counts for deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation by
the vendor, however, it may have a greater chance that its litigation
will succeed.
To survive in the competitive marketplace, a computer vendor
may make many written and oral statements designed to induce the
user to select its products and services. Many of these representations
68.
69.

70.
1982).
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
See Chados Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304 (3rd Cir.
Black,
Id.
Id.

ApPENDIX

B at 563.
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will be made in the vendor's product literature and company
brochures. If the user has enough time to analyze the various systems
offered, the user may request, and the vendor may submit, a proposal
which describes the vendor's system that can be designed, imple
mented, and installed to "meet the customer's needs." Oral state
ments made by salespeople and marketing analysts are another source
of representations upon which a user may rely in making its decision.
Consequently, vendors use the kind of protective language that ap
pears in their standard contracts to shield themselves against unau
thorized statements made by their sales representatives, or a user's
mistaken interpretation of proper sales talk. 74
Under common law principles, if the user can show that any of
these representations (which may include nondisclosures or omissions
of certain facts) were made fraudulently, with the intent to induce the
user to obtain the vendor's products and services, and that the user
obtained the vendor's system relying on such misstatements to its det
riment, a valid cause of action for fraud or deceit willlie. 7s
B.

Westfield and Black: A Preliminary Examination

At first glance, it may appear that the law in Massachusetts has
gone in opposite directions with respect to whether a customer actu
ally can succeed in bringing an action for fraud against a computer
vendor for its misrepresentations. In Westfield, the plaintiff-purchaser
claimed the computer vendor had made at least one misrepresentation
in its written proposal given to the plaintiff before it signed the sales
contract.76 The court ruled the allegation was not a basis for a fraud
action,77 quoting from Harris v. Delco Products, Inc. 78 the general
principle that "the law refuses to permit recovery in tort for damages
resulting from reliance upon false statements of belief, of conditions to
exist in the future, or of matters promissory in nature."79 The court
also noted the exception mentioned in Harris for statements made by a
party in a "fiduciary capacity."80
74. See R. BIGELOW, CoNTRACTING FOR CoMPUTER HARDWARE, SOFI'WARE,
AND SERVICES, § 4.01 et. seq. (1st ed. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 1985).
75. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). See also W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, TORTS, 727-29 (5th ed. 1984).
76. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 551.
77. Id.
78. 305 Mass. 362, 25 N.E.2d 740 (1940).
79. Id. at 365, 25 N.E.2d at 742.
80. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 551. The court did not consider or discuss the possi
bility of a fiduciary relationship. Other plaintiffs have tried to carry this idea of the com
puter vendor as a fiduciary party to a higher level by alleging a separate cause of action for
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Four years later in Black, the plaintiff-purchaser alleged that the
vendor's representatives made a number of pre-sales misrepresenta
tions regarding the vendor's abilities to produce and support a com
plete working computer system. 81 While acknowledging the general
principle quoted from Harris above, the court in Black cited two other
Massachusetts cases,82 one decided before Westfield,83 and one after
wards,84 for the evolving proposition that: "'where parties to the
transaction are not on equal footing but where one has or should have
superior knowledge concerning the matters to which the representa
tions relate,' representations as to future events may be actionable."85
In Westfield and Black, we thus have two courts which consid
ered the issue of fraudulent misrepresentations in a computer acquisi
tion case, and reached different results. Is the law in Massachusetts
still unsettled in this area? A closer reading of both cases demon
strates that this is probably not the case.
C.

Westfield' A Difficult Case

Although it is unclear, the only alleged misrepresentation by the
defendant considered by the court in Westfield 86 appeared in the Bur
roughs' pre-sale proposal to the effect that, by obtaining defendant's
computer system, the plaintiff would realize a "substantial man-hour
savings"87 in its business operations. The court decided the statement
was not fraudulent. 88 In reaching this decision, the court referred to
defendant's affidavit that the statement in the proposal depended on a
number of outside factors such as the efficiency of the plaintiff's operacomputer professional malpractice. However, thus far these claims have met with little
success. See Rick's Furniture Distributing Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., No. 3-82-0770-H (N.D.
Tx. September 7, 1984) and other cases cited therein.
81. Black, ApPENDIX B at 555.
82. Id. at 564. Inexplicably, while citing Westfield earlier in its opinion for other
propositions, the Black court made no attempt to distinguish its holding on plaintiff's count
for fraudulent misrepresentation from the Westfield holding on the same issue.
83. Cellucciv. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 320 N.E.2d 919 (1974), affd, 368
Mass. 811, 331 N.E.2d 813 (1975).
84. Gopen v. American Supply Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 342,407 N.E.2d 1255 (1980).
85. Black, ApPENDIX B at 564 (quoting Gopen v. American Supply Co., 10 Mass.
App. 342, 345,407 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (1980); Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. 722,
730, 370 N.E.2d 919, 924 (1974)).
86. The court quoted one specific representation from plaintiff's answers to interrog
atories alleged to have been made by defendant's employee. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 551.
The court did not specifically state, however, whether this was the only misrepresentation
claimed by plaintiff or whether this was just an example of the type of misrepresentations
that plaintiff had alleged.
87. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 551.
88. Id.
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tors in operating the system, the "caliber" of electrical current sup
plied to the computer, and the plaintiff's anticipated volume of
business to be processed. 89 Since such matters were "related to future
performances [and] not susceptible of actual knowledge,"90 there was
no deceit. Furthermore, Judge Greaney ruled that since the plaintiff
knew that the defendant's future performance depended on these
outside factors, it could not have reasonably relied on the defendant's
statements.91 In granting the defendant's motion for summary judg
ment with respect to the fraud count, the court cited liberally from the
Harris case:
When a representation relates to a matter not susceptible of per
sonal knowledge, it cannot be considered as anything more than a
strong expression of opinion, notwithstanding it is made positively
and as of the maker's own knowledge. The mere fact that it is
stated positively cannot make it a statement of fact. The most any
one can do as to such matters is to express his opinion. It cannot be
found, from the single fact that such a statement is untrue, that it
was made with fraudulent intent; there must also be evidence that
the maker knew it was in some respect untrue, before there is any
thing to submit to the jury. 92

In Harris, the defendant-well-digger induced the plaintiff-land
owner to hire defendant to drill a well through repeated assurances
that the defendant would definitely not strike salt water. 93 When the
defendant struck salt water and not fresh water, the plaintiff sued,
claiming fraud. The court rejected this claim, stating that the plaintiff
had to have known at the time the statements were made that no one
could tell what was below the surface of the plaintiff's land until the
hole was actually dug and the water tested. 94
Regardless of whether the Westfield court's reliance on Harris
was justified, one wonders whether other facts may have existed in
Westfield that might have prevented it from being analogized to Har
ris. The opinion does not indicate that the plaintiff produced any evi
dence that defendant Burroughs: (1) could have reasonably predicted
the probable performance level of Westfield's employees in operating
the Burroughs system (given certain training they would receive from
Burroughs), and (2) had inquired of, and did obtain from the plaintiff,
89. Id.
Id.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 551-52 (emphasis in original).
93. Harris, 305 Mass. at 363, 25 N.E.2d at 741.
94. Id. at 365, 25 N.E.2d at 742.

90.
91.
92.
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a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's anticipated business growth. If
so, the plaintiff might well have argued that Burroughs' man-hour sav
ings prediction was within Burroughs' actual knowledge and, there
fore, could be relied upon. That being the case, the court might not
have held that Harris was controlling. Additionally, issues as to mate
rial fact would have been raised, and summary judgment presumably
would not have been granted. 9s
On the other hand, the ruling in Westfield may have been reached
because the plaintiff simply did not have a case to support an action in
deceit. In other words, the strength of the facts to be presented were
not sufficient to elevate the case from one of mere sales puffing to one
in which a genuine issue offraud existed. 96 If this were true, then the
ruling in Westfield may have been right, although for the wrong rea
sons. Based on the facts presented, Westfield may well be another il
lustration of the adage "hard cases make bad law."
Nevertheless, from a computer user's viewpoint, a disturbing
finding in Westfield is the court's implication (admittedly unclear) that
because the alleged misstatement made by Burroughs appeared in a
pre-sales proposal and effectively disclaimed in the sales contract,97
the plaintiff was precluded from alleging a cause of action based on
tortious misrepresentation. 98 At least one other court has cited West
field for this proposition, albeit in dicta. 99 But if such were the case,
any claim for fraud based on statements made by a vendor during the
negotiation stage could be precluded simply by having the customer
sign a sales agreement with a standard integration clause. lOO
95. See MASS. R. CIV; P. 56(c).
96. Frye Shoe Co. v. Williams, 312 Mass. 656,46 N.E.2d 1 (1942).
97. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 551. The contract signed by the parties contained a
standard integration clause. Id. at 548.
98. Id. at 552-53. Judge Greaney stated, "Other courts have held that the same
Burroughs contract barred similar claims couched in the language of fraud and deceit
where the claims were 'essentially' contract claims." Id. (citing Investors Premium Corp.
v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974». In Investors Premium, however, plain
tiff-purchaser based its deceit claim on defendant's misrepresentation that one computer
could handle all of the plaintifrs needs. 389 F. Supp. at 42. However, instead of buying
defendant's system in reliance on this misstatement, plaintiff leased a system, discovered for
itself that one system would not do the job, and then purchased two systems. Id. at 41. The
court concluded that by its own actions, plaintiff had conclusively shown that it had not
relied on defendant's misrepresentation since it had bought two systems, and therefore the
merger clause in the contract for those systems effectively prevented the plaintiff from rais
ing its fraud count. Id. at 46.
99. See Earman Oil Co., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.IO (5th Cir.
1980) ("We in any event feel that the misrepresentation claim is in essence a contract
related claim and thus redundant and impermissible"). Id.
100. Even Judge Freedman appears to be leaning in this direction early in his analy
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In Black, the basis of the plaintiff-purchaser's fraud claim in
volved a series of alleged misrepresentations made by the defendant
Burroughs about the design, development, and capabilities of its com
puter system. 101 The court acknowledged the general rule that Massa
chusetts law "refuses to permit recovery in tort for damage resulting
from reliance upon false statements of belief, of conditions to exist in
the future, or of matters promissory in nature." 102 However, the court
distinguished the instant case from this rule by holding that Burroughs
had, or should have had, superior knowledge with respect to its own
computer systems and thus to the misstatements it was alleged to have
. made.103 It further explained:
As a company engaged in the sale of computer systems, Burroughs
must be considered to have superior knowledge about available
hardware and software and their capabilities. While it is true that
the future performance of obligations under a contract is often a
matter of conjecture at the time written agreements are executed,
misrepresenting one's own ability to perform, that is, inducing a
party to enter into a contract by claiming the present ability to per
form certain obligations, may rise to the level of fraudulent misrep
sis of plaintiff's tort claim. See Black, ApPENDIX B at 565, stating: "the claim alleged
appears to be no more than a redundant effort to recover in tort for breach of contract, for
the specific misrepresentations set forth closely relate to the performance contemplated by
the [sales] [a]greements . . . ." Id. In fairness, it could be argued that the Westfield court
was persuaded to bar plaintiff's tort claim not so much on grounds of duplication of the
contract counts, but more because Burroughs' agent's representations were part of the pre
sales proposal. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. Cf, APLications, Inc. v. Hew
lett-Packard Co., 672 F.2d 1076, 1077 (2d Cir. 1982) (buyer's reliance on defendant's mis
representations not justified because buyer was more knowledgeable in field of computer
science than defendant's agents).
101. Black, ApPENDIX B at 564. The court recounted those alleged misrepresenta
tives as follows:
(a) the defendant would install a new and complete computer system (B-800)
with capabilities to handle all information and processing that the plaintiff
was currently undertaking, with appropriate capacity for future expansion as
well as capability for "Newstand" plug-in, accounting and payables;
(b) Software would be handled as part of the contract either by the defendant or
sub-contracted by the defendant to the specifications of the plaintiff, in con
sultation with and to the complete satisfaction of the plaintiff;
(c) The defendant would provide all necessary back-up and support for twelve
months after the commencement of the program;
(d) The defendant would send several of its representatives to the plaintiff's
place of business prior to the execution of the subject agreements to deter
mine the specific needs of the plaintiffs.
Id.
102. Id. (citing Loughery v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mass. 172, 175 (1927».
103. Id. at 565.
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resentation actionable in tort. 104
Because material issues of fact existed regarding whether Burroughs
had the present ability to deliver the system which it had represented
to the plaintiff it could deliver, Judge Freedman denied Burrough's
motion for summary judgment on the fraud action. 105
In reaching this decision, the court relied heavily on the Cellucci
v. Sun Oil Co. 106 and Gopen v. American Supply Co., Inc. 107 cases, both
decided by the Massachusetts Appeals Court. In Cellucci, the plain
tiff-landowner wished to sell his land to an interested third party, but
claimed he was induced not to sell the property by the defendant's
agent's oral statements that the defendant absolutely intended to buy
the land and had exclusive rights to buy it. 108 When the defendant
ultimately refused to purchase the property, the plaintiff sued for spe
cific performance and the defendant claimed the statute of frauds de
fense. 109 In holding the defendant should be estopped from asserting
this defense, the Massachusetts Appeals Court recognized the "supe
rior knowledge"lIO exception to the general rule that "representations
as to future events are not actionable." 11 1 Further clarifying matters,
it added, "a prediction that Sunoco will sign a contract is not like a
prediction as to the weather. It lies within the entire and exclusive
control of Sunoco."112
Likewise, in Gopen, the Massachusetts Appeals Court found that
misrepresentations regarding the future net worth of a subsidiary cor
poration made by an attorney representing both the parent and subsid
iary to the plaintiff-lessees were actionable in fraud. JI3 In addition to
citing the above passages from Cellucci, the court stated that "the ex
tent of the assets of the corporation was a matter susceptible of actual
104. [d.
105. Id.
106. 2 Mass. App. 722, 320 N.E.2d 919 (1974), affd, 368 Mass. 811, 331 N.E.2d 813
(1975).
107. 10 Mass. App. 342, 407 N.E.2d 1255 (1980).
108. 2 Mass. App. at 725-26, 320 N.E.2d at 921-22.
109. [d. at 727, 320 N.E.2d at 923.
110. Id. at 730, 320 N.E.2d at 924.
Ill. Id. The Cellucci court recognized that plaintilrs signing of a purchase and sale
agreement was nothing more than an offer which the defendant did not accept. Id. at 727,
320 N.E.2d at 923 (1974). Nevertheless, because defendant's agent misled the plaintiff into
thinking the defendant would accept the offer, and the plaintiff relied on that misrepresen
tation to his detriment, the court held the defendant was estopped from denying acceptance
of the offer.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. [d. 10 Mass. App. at 345-46, 407 N.E.2d at 1257.
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knowledge and was not a matter of opinion." 114
E. A Closer Analysis
When read in light of the Cellucci and Gopen cases, the reasoning
in Black appears persuasive and fair. As a developer of sophisticated
computer systems, Burroughs, in making statements to Black that it
intended to deliver a computer system with certain capabilities, must
be viewed as one with superior knowledge lIS and control over such
predictions. 116 In other words, Burroughs must be viewed as the party
with actual knowledge of such statements. 117 Black's allegations that
such statements were fraudulently made and that it relied on these
promises by Burroughs were held sufficient to have this issue
presented to the jury.I1S
Although the decision in Westfield was made before the Gopen
case was decided, the court's reliance on Harris, to the exclusion of
Cellucci, seems misplaced. Moreover, while plainti1rs allegation of
fraud in Westfield did not concern a statement by Burroughs regard
ing the operating capabilities of its system per se (as was true in Black),
one can argue the statement did describe indirectly, if not directly, the
performance capabilities of Burroughs' system. Although Burroughs'
predictions regarding the number of man-hours Westfield would save
with its system involved factors not exclusively under its control, the
ld. at 345, 407 N.E.2d 1257.
115. Accusystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 474, 484
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding defendant liable for fraud, the court acknowledged that while
plaintiffs principal had prior experience with computers, "this is a dynamically growing
industry, [plaintiffs] reliance . . . was reasonable"). ld. But see APLications, Inc. v. Hew
lett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982)
(plaintiff was much more knowledgeable than defendant's representatives to rely on their
statements and sales brochures).
116. A similar theory was espoused by Judge William W. Schwarzer in the cele
brated case of The Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., No. C-79-3393-WWS (N.D. Cal.
1981). See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
117. See Dunn Appraisal v. Honeywell Information Sys., 687 F.2d 877 (6th Cir.
1982) (affirming judgment against defendant in action alleging fraudulent misrepresenta
tion). In Dunn, defendant's agents represented defendant's computer was "best suited" for
plaintiffs operation and projected business expansion. In rejecting defendant's arguments
that such statements were opinions about the future, the court said: "General representa
tions that data processing equipment will be suitable for a customer's operations, based
upon familiarity with both the equipment's capabilities and the customer's needs, are state
ments concerning present facts." ld. at 882.
118. See also AccuSystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., No. 80 Civ.
5710 (DDB) (S.D.N.Y. October 26, 1982) (defendant's summary judgment on plaintiffs
count for fraudulent inducement denied). But see APLications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982).
114.
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same is true of any statement by a vendor predicting the performance
of its product that is operated or used by human hands.
In today's world, predictions by computer vendors regarding the
performance of their machines in selected industries are done rou
tinely and can be very accurate, even given the factor of human inter
vention (which is usually incorporated into a vendor's calculations).
Certainly such forecasts are not nearly as unpredictable as a weather
forecast or the composition of water in a subterranean well. There can
be no doubt that computer vendors intend and expect prospective
users to rely on their predictions.

v.

CONCLUSION

Both Black and Westfield were decided on motions for summary
judgment. The difference between the two may well have been the
quality of affidavits and evidence available to the plaintiff's counsel.
Perhaps Westfield was just a hard case because it contained murky
facts or facts insufficient to support the plaintiff's claim. It is unfortu
nate that the Westfield court did not discuss Cellucci; understandably,
its applicability may not have been as apparent in 1977 as it was in
1981. With the decision in Black, however, many claims of deceit or
fraudulent misrepresentation by a dissatisfied computer user which are
based on alleged misrepresentations made by a vendor concerning its
system's capabilities and/or future performance should survive a ven
dor's summary judgment motion.
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ApPENDIX At
WESTFIELD CHEMICAL CORP. V. BURROUGHS CORP.
Massachusetts Superior Court, Hampden County, April 15, 1977
Civil Action No. 134475
GREANEY, J. This is a suit brought by Westfield Chemical Cor
poration against Burroughs Corporation alleging breach of contract
and breach of express and implied warranties, fraud and negligence in
connection with the manufacture, sale and servicing of a Burroughs
computer.
On January 28, 1971 the parties entered into a written equipment
sales contract,1 a copy of which is appended to the affidavits. In that
contract the seller, Burroughs Corporation, warranted that the equip
ment was free from defects in material and workmanship and agreed
to exchange any defective equipment for a period of one year from
delivery. However, the contract expressly and conspicuously dis
claimed all express or implied warranties, including any for
merchantability or fitness. It also provided that the entire obligation
of the seller in connection with the transaction was contained in the
contract.
The plaintiff alleges an express warranty by the defendant that the
computer would generate efficiency and time savings and was fit for
the plaintitrs account system (Declaration, Count I); an implied war
ranty that the system was fit for the particular use to which it was put
by the plaintiff (Declaration, Count III); and a contractual agreement
by the defendant to assemble, program, maintain, and service the
equipment (Declaration, Count II). The plaintiff also asserts claims
that are expressed in tort language, but the underlying allegations in
those claims are virtually identical with the assertions contained in the

t Reprinted with pennission from 21 UCC Rep. Servo 1293, published by Callaghan
Company, 3201 Old Glenview Road, Wilmette, Illinois 60091. The footnotes herein are
reprinted as they appear in 21 UCC Rep. Servo 1293.
1. On the same date, the parties also signed a separate "Application Software Sup
port Contract." The plaintiff at times seems to claim damages caused by an alleged delay
in completing the programming called for under this contract, more particularly the so
called "batch ticket program." (Declaration, Count II; Plaintitrs Answers to Interrogato
ries Propounded by the Defendant, Answers 4(b), (c), 13, and 14(b).)
Any such claim is barred by the provisions of that contract which also limits liability
and disclaims warranties and representations. But even if these disclaimers and limitations
were held ineffective in the circumstances of this case, the most that the plaintiff could
recover would be its reasonable damages caused by any alleged delay in the delivery of the
program. He cannot thereby acquire any rights to recover for defective machinery, mainte
nance or repair services covered by the other contract.
&
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warranty counts. (Declaration, Count IV [negligence], Count V
[fraudulent inducement]).
This case was heard before the court on March 23, 1977, pursu
ant to the defendant's motion under Mass R Civ P 56 for summary
judgment. From an examination of the evidentiary material submit
ted, as well as the issues raised during oral argument, and the briefs, I
find that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and
that the defendant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
First, I find that the disclaimer of implied and express warranties
contained in the contract complies with OLc 106, §1-201(1O) and is
conspicuous. I also find that the disclaimer is valid and effective so as
to disclaim all warranties express or implied pursuant to OLc 106, §2
316, and to therefore determine any rights that the plaintiff has to re
cover for claimed breach of warranties. Other courts have held that
identical language in contracts of the defendant in use in other states
has effectively disclaimed all express and implied warranties. Bakal·v.
Burroughs Corp., 343 NYS2d 541, 74 Misc2d 202 [13 UCC Rep 60]
(1972); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., Civil No. 72
1526 (DSC Feb. 1, 1974). See, OLe 106, §2-719, Official UCC Com
ment 3 (discussing unconscionability) ("The seller in all cases is free to
disclaim warranties in the manner provided in Section 2-316."). The
Investors Premium Corp. decision, not a decision of record * though
thoroughly in point here, is attached to defendant's brief, and covers
issues germane to those present in this case.
I also find that the plaintiff and the defendant validly agreed upon
a limitation of damages as governed by OLe 106, §2-719, and that the
defendant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law on any claim for
damages other than replacement or repair of defective parts of the
computer.
The contract in issue here provides:
"Seller shall deliver, install and service the equipment as promptly
as is reasonably possible, but shall not be held responsible for delay
in delivery, installation or service, nor in any event under this agree
ment for more than an exchange of equipment under its warranty,
upon return of the equipment to the seller, with seller's prior writ
ten consent. (Purchaser hereby expressly waives all damages,
whether direct, incidental or consequential.)"

OLe 106, §2-719(1) specifically provides that "the agreement may.
limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article,
• [The court is in error. The decision referred to was reported in 389 F Supp 39 as
well as in 17 vee Rep llS.-ED.].
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as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repay
ment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming
goods or parts . . ." The purpose of this provision is to leave the
parties "free to shape their remedies to their particular requirements
and reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies are to be
given effect." GLc 106, §2-719, Official UCC Comment 1.
GLc 106, §2-719(3) provides:
"Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the lim
itation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is
prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damage where the loss
is commercial is not." (Emphasis added.)

This agreement is not unconscionable. "The principle [of uncon
scionability] is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise
. . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power." GLc 106, §2-302, Official UCC Comment 1. The
majority of contracts held unconscionable have been in the area of
consumer transactions. E.g., Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F2d 445 [2 UCC Rep 955] (DC Cir 1965), and this contract is
between businessmen acting at presumed arms length.
Nor has the limited remedy provided by this contract failed of its
essential purpose. At any time the plaintiff could have returned any
defective part for repair or replacement. Compare Wilson Trading
Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 NY2d 398, 244 NE2d 685, 297
NYS2d 108 [5 UCC Rep 1213] (1968) (remedy fails of its essential
purpose where time for reporting defect was shorter than time reason
ably necessary to discover it).
I also find that the contract makes it clear that the seller will
provide maintenance coverage for twelve months at no additional cost,
but shall not be liable for damages or losses in the rendering of that
maintenance. Under these circumstances, the absence of any claim
that the seller did not in fact offer "as well trained and competent a
staff of service technicians as are available in the industry," the plain
tiff cannot recover for damages allegedly caused by delays in rendering
of maintenance coverage, and this entitles the defendant to judgment
on Count II alleging breach of the maintenance contract.
Furthermore, I find that any alleged misrepresentation concern
ing the function of the computer related to future performances not
susceptible of actual knowledge and cannot serve as a basis for recov
ery in fraud. See, Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., 305 Mass 362. The
plaintiff is, therefore, barred by GLc 106, §2-202 from introducing evi

1985]

PERFORMANCE CLAIMS

551

dence as to alleged representations made by the seller during the sale
negotiations, particularly in view of the clause in the contract limiting
the entire obligation of the parties to what appears in the written
agreement. The mere characterization of representations as "fraudu
lent" is insufficient to take them out of the general rule that one is
bound by the terms of the written agreement, whether he reads and
understands it or not. See Conney v. New England Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 353 Mass 158.
Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., supra, in point here on the fraud
claims, provides that:
"It is well settled in this Commonwealth that the charge of fraudu
lent intent, in an action for deceit, may be maintained by proof of a
statement made, as of the party's own knowledge, which is false,
provided the thing stated is not a matter of opinion, estimate, or
judgment, but is susceptible of exact knowledge . . . Representa
tions, although false, concerning matters not susceptible of actual
knowledge have been held to be nonactionable, at least when made
by one not in a fiduciary capacity. . . and it is a general rule that
the law refuses to permit recovery in tort for damages resulting
from reliance upon false statements of belief, of conditions to exist
in the future, or of matters promissory in nature."

This test applies as well to contract actions. Id., at 364.
Any representations made by the defendant here necessarily re
lated to the future. The plaintiff, when asked to given particulars con
cerning misrepresentations made by the defendant has insured m
interrogatories:
"(a) One such warranty was conveyed by Burroughs proposal
date 14 September 1970 signed by Richard Carlson, the substance
of which was a substantial man-hour savings. The savings never
materialized, and, in fact, operating time exceeded man-hours origi
nally performed manually by Westfield Chemical Corporation."
Plaintitrs Answers to Interrogatories Propounded by the Defend
ant, Answers 21, 14.
As is apparent from the affidavit of Julius J. Samal, appended to de
fendant's motion for summary judgment, man-hour savings are depen
dent upon such variables as the program actually decided upon, the
cooperation and the efficiency of the operators, the caliber of the elec
trical current supplied to the computer, the volume of business being
processed, etc., none of which were susceptible of knowledge when the
proposal was written.
"When a representation relates to a matter not susceptible of per
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sonal knowledge, it cannot be considered as anything more than a
strong expression of opinion, notwithstanding it is made positively
and as of the maker's own knowledge. The mere fact that it is
stated positively cannot make it a statement of fact. The most any
one can do as to such matters is to express his opinion. It cannot be
found, from the single fact that such a statement is untrue, that it
was made with fraudulent intent; there must also be evidence that
the maker knew it was in some respect untrue, before there is any
thing to submit to the jury." (Emphasis added.) Harris v. Delco
Products, Inc., supra, at 366 (1940).
Furthermore, as a matter of law the plaintiff could not have reason
ably relied upon such representations. Harris v. Delco Products, Inc.,
supra.
"... Regardless of what has been said about the matter, or of how
strongly the statement has been put, he knows that the speaker can
not actually know what the fact of the matter is, and that, therefore,
he is not justified in relying on what can, in its nature, be nothing
more than the opinion, however strong, of the speaker on the mat
ter." Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., supra, at 367.
This is particularly true where, as here, any statements were made
during the early planning stages. Compare Yerid v. Mason, 341 Mass
527 (1960) with Pietrazak v. McDermott, 341 Mass 107 (1960) (stage
of completion distinguishing factor where defendants represented that
cellars would be dry).
Moreover, the letter dated September 14, 1970 from Richard
Carlson clearly states:
"This recommendation of Burroughs products is submitted for your
consideration and guidance only in the hope that we may be favored
with your order. Since this proposal is preliminary only, the order
when issued shall constitute the only legally binding commitment of
the parties." (Emphasis added).

It should also be noted that this is not a case where the nature of
the thing being sold was misrepresented, City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner,
232 Ga 766, 208 SE2d 794 [15 VCC Rep 598] (1974) (dealer repre
sented to consumer that car had never been previously owned), or the
nature of the contract being signed was kept from the plaintiff. Com
pare Schell v. Ford Motor Co., 270 F2d 384 (1st Cir 1959) (applying
Massachusetts law) (consumer not barred from suing where release
saying no representations had been made was characterized as a pass
to enter the plant). Other courts have held that the same Burroughs
contract barred similar claims couched in the language of fraud and
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deceit where the claims were "essentially" contract claims. E.g., In
vestors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., supra.
In summary, the breach of warranty counts fail because of the
existence of a complete, conspicuous and valid disclaimer.
The breach of contract count fails because of the limitation of
damage clause in the contract which is valid and enforceable and is
not claimed to have been breached.
The count claiming fraud fails on the authority of Harris v. Delco
Products Inc., supra, which I find controls this claim based on the
materials submitted.
Finally, the negligent manufacture count fails since it is basically
a duplicate of the warranty and contract counts and hence barred by
the agreement, and since nothing has been indicated factually to show
any triable issue on the negligent manufacture claim.
On the basis of the foregoing, I find this to be an appropriate case
for a Rule 56 motion and summary judgment to be entered for the
defendant on all counts.
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BURROUGHS CORP.

United States District Court, District of Massachusetts
December 18, 1981
Civil Action No. 78-30777-F

MEMORANDUM
FREEDMAN, D.J.
Defendant and third-party plaintiff Burroughs Corporation
("Burroughs") filed a motion for summary judgment "on its behalf as
against plaintiff Samuel Black Company" ("Black") which was re
ferred to a Magistrate. The Magistrate determined that genuine issues
of material fact remained to be resolved and thus recommended that
Burroughs' motion be denied. Burroughs seasonably objected to the
Recommendation of the Magistrate. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) requires
that I make a de novo determination of those portions of the Magis
trate's Recommendation to which objection is made, and permits me
to "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part," the Recommendation
of the Magistrate. [d.
While Burroughs' objections were pending, Black moved to
amend its complaint and subsequently moved to reopen discovery for
the limited purpose of filing an additional set of interrogatories and a
request for production of documents. Burroughs has filed oppositions
to Black's motions.
In this Memorandum, I address Burroughs' objections to the
Magistrate's Recommendation and Black's motions. For the reasons
stated herein, I am today. entering orders modifying the Recommenda
tion of the Magistrate by granting Burroughs' motion for summary
judgment as to Count I of Black's complaint against it, but adopting
the Magistrate's Recommendation of denial with respect to Counts II
and III. I will also grant Black's motion to amend its complaint by
adjusting the damages sought in Counts II and III and by adding a
new Count IV. However, I will deny Black's motion to reopen discov
ery for the limited purposes requested.
II.
Plaintiff Black is a Massachusetts business trust with a principal
place of business in West Springfield, Massachusetts, and is engaged,
t Reprinted verbatim from the slip opinion. All subsequent footnotes were provided
by the court.
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inter alia, in the wholesale distribution of newspapers, magazines, and
paperback books. Lewis A. Black is a trustee of and owner of all the
beneficial interest in the Black business trust. The instant litigation
arises out of a computer system transaction, whereby Black agreed to
purchase for substantial sums of money a sophisticated computer sys
tem from Burroughs, a Michigan Corporation with a principal place
of business in that state and a regional branch office in Springfield,
Massachusetts.
In early 1977, Black was actively considering whether to install
an in-house computer system adaptable to its then current and future
business needs. At the time, Black was utilizing a computer service
bureau in Tampa, Florida, and apparently thought certain efficiencies
and improvements would be achieved by changing over to an in-house
system.
Among several computer systems soliciting Black's business was
Burroughs, the agents of which approached Black and through an ex
tended course of discussions and negotiations formulated a written
proposal for the delivery and installation of a sophisticated computer
system suitable to Black's business needs. In his affidavit, Lewis A.
Black states that "Agents of the Burroughs Corporation explicitly told
me ... that Burroughs had the present capability to make opera
tional such a [sophisticated] system . . . [and that Black] would have
an operational system on or before December 1, 1977." Affidavit of
Lewis A. Black, at 2. While deposition testimony of employees and
former employees of Burroughs to a lesser or greater extent contra
dicts the fact and nature of the representations made to Black by Bur
roughs' agents, see, e.g. Deposition of Nicholas Lentino, Volume I, at
39-45, Lewis Black states in his affidavit that "Because of these repre
sentations, I, on behalf of the Samuel Black Company, executed an
agreement on or about August 25, 1977, at West Springfield, Massa
chusetts wherein [Black] agreed to purchase the subject computer sys
tem." Affidavit of Lewis A. Black, at 2.
In fact, three written agreements were executed by the parties on
August 25, 1977 ("August Agreements"). Detailed discussion of the
terms and conditions of these agreements is postponed to an ensuing
section. 1 It suffices to note here that all three were standard Bur
roughs forms, one being a Burroughs Agreement for Equipment Sale,
the other two being Burroughs Software and Support Agreements.
Affidavit of Francis Dibble, Esq., Appendices 1, 2, and 3. Although
the parties subsequently executed additional written agreements and
1. See Part IV, A, infra.
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made adjustments in the price of the computer hardware, see id., Ap
pendices 4, 5, 6, and 7, the August Agreements established the basic
contractual relationship between the parties and provided for the sale,
delivery, and installation of both computer hardware and software.
From Black's point of view, with the benefit of hindsight, the deal
quickly soured. There is no dispute that the computer hardware was
delivered in late December 1977, and, while there is some disagree
ment on this point, the hardware seemed to be in working order.
There is also no dispute that the software for the Black computer sys
tem never did arrive at Black's place of business. Thus, Black never
got a functioning computer system.
Little purpose would be served by attempting to present the con
flicting accounts in affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and deposi
tion testimony as to why the software was never delivered. Briefly
stated, there is evidence that Burroughs intended to purchase suitable
software from a Pennsylvania company, but this plan was aban
doned-although it is not clear whether the plan was abandoned
before or after the execution of the August Agreements. Further,
there is testimony that illness prevented certain Burroughs personnel
from completing the design and creation of the specific software neces
sary for the proper functioning of the contemplated computer system.
What is clear is the fact that Burroughs prevailed upon Black to agree
to extensions of time for Burroughs' performance, initially to the
Spring of 1978, and thereafter to November 1, 1978. It is at this junc
ture, that is, when problems arose in securing suitable software, that
Computer Assistance, Incorporated ("CAl"), a Connecticut Corpora
tion with a principal place of business in West Hartford, Connecticut,
became involved with the Burroughs-Black transaction.
According to answers to interrogatories filed by CAl, Burroughs
in February 1978 sub-contracted the work of studying Black's
software needs to CAl. Burroughs and CAl apparently reached two
oral agreements; first, that CAl for payment of $900.00 would conduct
a study to determine the cost of developing a complete order process
ing system for the Samuel Black Company; second, for payment of
$32,000.00, CAl would develop a complete order processing system at
Samuel Black Company by November 1, 1978. See CAl's Answers to
Interrogatories of Burroughs, at 4-5. The exact date of these agree
ments is the subject of conflicting deposition testimony, but there
seems to be no dispute that oral agreements were made.
During the Spring of 1978, Black and Burroughs executed addi
tional equipment and software agreements. CAl began its work at
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Black's place of business, but experienced some difficulty meeting
deadlines because of the illness of one of its personnel. Black's increas
ing concern for the completion of the software grew to exasperation
with the performance of Burroughs and CAl, and Black through its
attorneys wrote a letter to Burroughs dated August 19, 1978, in part
as follows:
You are hereby advised that effective immediately, Samuel Black
Company hereby cancels any and all Agreements which it may have
had with Burroughs, and shall look to Burroughs for any and all
damages including loss of profits which result from Burroughs' ac
tions in regard to said Agreements. Moreover, you are further ad
vised that Samuel Black Company considers the misrepresentations
made by agents of Burroughs with reference to the commencement
of the system operation to be an unfair or deceptive practice as de
clared unlawful by Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 93A in
that but for the said misrepresentations, Samuel Black Company
would not have entered into the subject Agreement.

Complaint, Count I, ~ 4, and Exhibit C. Thereafter, Black made the
computer hardware in its possession available to Burroughs for pick
up and the equipment was returned to Burroughs on September 28,
1978.
Black filed suit against Burroughs in state court in November
1978 alleging three counts: first, a claim for breach of contract; sec
ond, a claim for knowing and wilful violation of M.G.L. c. 93A; and
third, a claim for tortious misrepresentation. Burroughs removed to
this Court alleging diversity and an amount in controversy greater
than $10,000.00, see 28 U.S.c. § 1441(a), answered interposing several
defenses, and counterclaimed against Black for amounts owing under
the contracts between the parties. Burroughs subsequently filed a
third-party complaint against CAl, alleging breach of contract in two
counts for CAl's failure to perform the oral agreements for design dif
fer so substantially that this Court is satisfied that there are indeed
questions of material fact to be determined in this case.") While I am
in agreement with the ultimate conclusion of the Magistrate with re
spect to Counts II and III of Black's complaint against Burroughs, my
de novo review of the entire factual record convinces me that Bur
roughs is entitled to summary judgment on Count I of the complaint.
IV.

I will address the three counts of Black's complaint in light of
Burroughs' motion and the undisputed factual record as follows: first,
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the contract claim; second, the claim for tortious misrepresentation;
and finally, the claim under Chapter 93A.
A.

Contract

There is no genuine dispute that Black and Burroughs executed a
series of written agreements, all standard Burroughs forms, the most
important of which were the Agreement for Equipment Sale ("AES")
and the two Software and Support Agreements ("SSA") signed by rep
resentatives of the parties on August 25, 1977. All subsequent agree
ments executed by the parties relate to the performance set forth in the
. August Agreements, and, with the exception of a letter of understand
ing adjusting the contract amount, are all on identical Burroughs
forms. 2 Furthermore, there is no genuine dispute concerning the ex
tensions of time for performance agreed to by Black, albeit reluctantly,
which made Burroughs' performance due on November 1, 1978.
Given these two undisputed material facts, that is, the existence of the
written agreements and a subsequent agreement as to time of perform
ance, I conclude that Burroughs is entitled to summary judgment on
Black's contract claims against it.
The AES provides for the sale of a B-800 computer by Burroughs
to Black for a total price of $58,435.00 before adjustments for down
payment, trade-in, and taxes. On its face, the AES states the following
in large type:
Any program or software . . . supplied in conjunction with this
agreement is subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein
and may be contained on a software and support agreement which
is incorporated by reference.

The agreement is signed by Nicholas Lentino on behalf of Burroughs,
and Lewis A. Black on behalf of Black. Above Black's signature ap
pears the following language in large type: "Customer by its signature
acknowledges that it has read this agreement, understands it, and
agrees to all its terms and conditions including those on the reverse
side." The reverse side sets out detailed provisions in fifteen numbered
clauses.
2. An AES was executed by the parties on December 23,1977 wherein Black agreed
to purchase a terminal display and keyboard for $3,307.50. On May 1, 1978, Black
purchased "Accounts Receivable Custom Programming" for $8,000.00, and on June 13,
1978 purchased "Operator Training" for $550.00. Both agreements are on SSA forms. A
letter dated May 1, 1978 from Nicholas Lentino to Black evidences an agreement to reduce
the original hardware contract price by $8,000.00 to adjust for the increased software price
of $8,000.00. See Affidavit of Francis Dibble, Esq., at Appendices 4, 5, 6, and 7.
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The SSAs executed by the parties provide for Burroughs furnish
ing the following software: "Accounts receivable, Invoicing, Bulk
Book and History with Complete OIR Regulation, including Mainte
nance and Reporting Programs" for an "initial charge" of $20,000.00
with an "Estimated Delivery Date" of January 1, 1978; and "Utilities"
and "System Software" for an "initial charge" of $540.00 and
$2,000.00 respectively, with an "Estimated Delivery Date" of Decem
ber 1, 1977. On the face of these agreements appears the following in
large type:
Customer acknowledges by its signature that it has read this agree
ment, understands it and that it constitutes the entire agreement,
understanding and representations, express or implied, between the
customer and Burroughs with respect to the program products and
services to be furnished hereunder and that this agreement super
sedes all prior communications between the parties including all
oral or written proposals. This agreement may be modified or
amended only by a written instrument signed by duly authorized
representatives of customer and Burroughs.
The terms and conditions, including the warranty and limitation of
liability, on the reverse side, are part of this agreement.

On the reverse side are fourteen numbered clauses. Both the AES and
SSA forms provide that the laws of the State of Michigan shall govern
the agreements. The AES in Clause 4 states in relevant part that "for
a period of one year from shipment, the equipment shall be free from
defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service,"
and that "Customer's sole and exclusive remedy in the event of defect
is expressly limited to correction of the defect by adjustment, repair or
replacement at Burroughs' election and sole expense. . . ." The SSA
form in Clause 9 states that "Customer agrees that its sole and exclu
sive remedy and Burroughs' sole obligation, if a Licensed Program
warranted hereunder fails to conform to the applicable design specifi
cations and Customer advised Burroughs of such failure in writing
during the term of the warranty, is for Burroughs to provide program
ming services to attempt to correct the defect." Both forms also set
forth in type larger than that of the surrounding clauses the following
terms:
EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED HEREIN, THERE
ARE NO WARRANTIES EXPRESS OR IMPLIED INCLUD
ING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICU
LAR PURPOSE.
IN NO EVENT SHALL BURROUGHS BE LIABLE FOR LOSS
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OF PROFITS, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR
OTHER SIMILAR DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF BREACH
OF THIS AGREEMENT OR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS
AGREEMENT.
BURROUGHS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAM
AGES CAUSED BY DELAY IN SHIPMENT, INSTALLATION
OR FURNISHING OF EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES UNDER
THIS AGREEMENT. 3

At the outset of analysis of the legal effect of these contract provi
sions, I note that Black has not challenged the terms and conditions of
the Burroughs standard forms on the basis of unconscionability, and
. the precedents cited by Burroughs suggest that such a challenge would
be fruitless. See, e.g., Earman Oil Company, Inc. v. Burroughs Corpo
ration, 625 F.2d 1291, 1299-1300 (5th Cir. 1980); Westfield Chemical
Company v. Burroughs Corporation, 21 VCC Rep. S. 1293, 1296
(Mass. Super. 1977). Neither has Black argued that the choice of law
provisions of the AES and SSA do not apply to its contract claim.
Instead, Black has vaguely4 advanced two arguments: first, that Bur
roughs "anticipatorily breached its contractual obligations," Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Law at 2; and second, that the exclusive remedy pro
visions of the written agreements do not contemplate the nature of
breach present in this case, and are thus ineffective. Id. at 5. In
Black's view, genuine issues of material fact remain to be resolved con
cerning these issues.
Before turning these contentions, I must consider a few prelimi
nary matters. First, the courts of Massachusetts would give effect to
the choice of law provisions of the written agreements, inasmuch as
Michigan, being Burroughs' state of incorporation and the location of
its principal place of business, bears a reasonable relationship to the
instant transaction. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Company v. Amerotron
Corporation, 339 Mass. 252, 257-58 (1959) (and cases cited therein);
compare, M.G.L. c. 106 § 1-105(1) ("when a transaction bears a rea
sonable relationship to this state and also to another state . . . the
parties may agree that the laws of either this state or of such other
state . . . shall govern their rights and duties . . . ."). A federal
3. The second paragraph of this clause in the SSA form is in slightly different
language:
Burroughs shall not be liable for any damages caused by delay in delivery, instal
lation or furnishing of the program product(s) and/or services under this
agreement.
4. Plaintiff advances these arguments in its memorandum in conclusory terms and
without any citations to authorities.
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court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules which the
forum state would apply. Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Manu
facturing Company, 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Therefore, I must apply
the law of Michigan in determining the validity of the instant agree
ments' terms and conditions and the rights and obligations of the par
ties thereunder.
Turning to Michigan law, I conclude that there is reason to doubt
whether the courts of Michigan would treat the computer system
transaction between Black and Burroughs as falling within the scope
of its version of the Uniform Commercial Code's ("UCC") article on
sales. s See Wells v. 1O-X Manufacturing Company, 609 F.2d 248, 255
(6th Cir. 1979). Clearly, both sales of goods and delivery of services
are contemplated by the AES and SSAs and this complex transaction
does not fit neatly within the language of UCC § 2-102; but see Note,
Computer Programs as Goods Under the UCC, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1149
(1979) (arguing that computer programs are analogous to phonograph
records, the sale of which falls within the UCC's coverage). Resolu
tion of the point is not critical, however; the UCC's provisions are
both helpful and persuasive by analogy, and I am unaware of any ad
vantage accruing to Black's benefit under the common law of Michi
gan which would alter the result in this particular case.
Both the parol evidence rule and the integration provisions of the
AES and SSA forms would bar Black's introduction of evidence of any
prior or contemporaneous oral agreement between the parties not re
flected on the face of the signed agreements. UCC § 2-202. The lan
guage of the written agreements does not specify a date for
performance, and time of performance is not made of the essence in
the written agreements. Rather, the August Agreements set forth "es
timated delivery dates" in December 1977 and January 1978.
When time is either not mentioned or not made of the essence in a
contract, a reasonable time for performance is inferred. UCC § 2-309;
Reinforced Concrete Company v. Boyes, 80 Mich. 609, 147 N.W. 577
(1914). What constitutes a reasonable time for performance would in
most cases present a jury question, see id., but in this case, the factual
record indicates that the parties agreed that Burroughs' performance
would be due on November 1, 1978. Clearly, no time could be more
5. The Michigan version of the uee is codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§§ 440.1101-.9994., the identity of the sections of the Official Code having been preserved
by combining the Michigan Compiled Laws chapter number with the official numbers. For
convenience, citations are made to the Official Code numbers.
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reasonable than that agreed upon by the parties themselves in their
course of dealing.
Black attempts to circumvent this point by first arguing that Bur
roughs "anticipatorily breached" its agreement, stating that "Black
felt that the performance . . . of Burroughs would not come to pass
and accordingly took the position that Burroughs had breached its
agreement to Black and that consideration for any of its extensions
had failed." Plaintiffs Memorandum at 5. This argument is uncon
vincing for two reasons. First, irrespective of what Black "felt" about
the future course of performance by Burroughs and its sub-contractor
CAl in July 1978, anticipatory repudiation is not implicated absent an
"unequivocal declar[ation of] intent not to perform. . . ." Jackson v.
American Gas Company, 485 F. Supp. 370, 373 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(applying Michigan law). The factual record contains no suggestion of
such an "unequivocal declaration" here. Second, while I note that an
agreement modifying a contract within the scope of Article II of the
vee needs no consideration to be binding, vee § 2-209(1), the issue
here is not the enforceability of or consideration given for the agree
ment to make Burroughs' performance due on November 1, 1978; in
stead, the fact that agreements were made provides a basis for
determining what time for performance was reasonable under the orig
inal August Agreements. Again, the most reasonable time is that
agreed to by the parties themselves during performance of their obliga
tions under the contract.
Moreoever, the warranty disclaimer provisions of the August
Agreements are conspicuous, mention merchantability, and are en
forceable. vee § 2-316. 6 While Black has characterized the exclu
sive remedy of repair and replacement and limitation of liability
clauses of the AES and SSA forms as "boilerplate," these clauses are
in accordance with the requirements of the vee and are effective.
vee § 2-719(1).7 Several courts confronted with identical or very
similar contract language in Burroughs forms have reached the same
6. This section provides in pertinent part:
". . .[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part
of it, the language must mention merchantability and in the case of a writing must
be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the
exclusion must be by writing and conspicuous."
vee § 2-316(2).
7. The section in its entirety provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section . . .
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitu
tion for those provided in this Article [II] and may limit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable under this Article . . . , and
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result. Earman Oil Company v. Burroughs Corporation, supra at 1298;
Westfield Chemical Company v. Burroughs Corporation, supra at 1295;
Investors Premium Corporation v. Burroughs Corporation, 389 F. Supp.
39, 45 (D. S.c. 1974). Thus, regardless of the question of breach, the
terms of the August Agreements themselves preclude the recovery
sought by Black in its contract claim.
The gravamen of Black's arguments concerning these clauses,
although not expressed in terms of art, is that the remedy provided for
in the August Agreements fails of its essential purpose. See UCC § 2
719(2). However, although there no doubt are circumstances where a
limited repair and replacement remedy essentially eviscerates a con
tract of its substance, this is not such a case. For a remedy provision
to fail of its essential purpose, that provision must have been resorted
to on occasion and found wanting. Here, the undisputed facts reveal
that the time for Burroughs' final performance was November 1, 1978.
Regardless of what rights Black may have had under UCC § 2-609 or
its common law counterpart to demand adequate assurances of per
formance, in August 1978 the exclusive remedy provision had not yet
been brought into play, much less had failed of its essential purpose.
Any repair or replacement of defective software was not implicated
before Burroughs had rendered final performance. Black does not dis
pute the fact that Burroughs, through its sub-contractor CAl, was at
tempting to finalize and deliver the software necessary for the Black
system when Black cancelled the agreements in August 1978,
although Black was and is of the view that Burroughs would not be
able to complete the task by November 1, 1978. Nevertheless, the ex
clusive and limited remedies of the AES and SSA could not have failed
of their essential purpose before they even became applicable.
Because my de novo review of the materials submitted persuades
me that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that Burroughs is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count I of Black's com
plaint against it, I will reject the Magistrate's Recommendation in part
and grant Burroughs' motion for summary judgment on Count I of
the complaint.
resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is ex
pressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its es
sential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury
to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable
but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
UCC § 2-719.
(b)
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Tort

In Count III of its complaint, Black incorporates by reference the
allegations of Count II, specifically referring to the following misrepre
sentations allegedly made by Burroughs:
(a)

the defendant would install a new and complete computer sys
tem (B-800) with capabilities to handle all information and
processing that the plaintiff was currently undertaking, with
appropriate capacity for future expansion as well as capability
for "Newstand" plug-in, accounting and payables;
(b) Software would be handled as part of the contract either by the
defendant or sub-contracted by the defendant to the specifica
tions of the plaintiff, in consultation with and to the complete
satisfaction of the plaintiff.
(c) The defendant would provide all necessary back-up and sup
port for twelve months after the commencement of the
program;
(d) The defendant would send several of its representatives to the
plaintiffs place of business prior to the execution of the subject
agreements to determine the specific needs of the plaintiffs.

Complaint, Count II, ~ 3.
Burroughs asserts that even indulging in all inferences favorable
to the plaintiff from the factual record, Black may not recover in tort
for these repJ;"esentations because they are promissory in nature. Black
counters this argument by reference to two Massachusetts Appeals
Court cases which in Black's view hold such misrepresentations
actionable.
The law of Massachusetts "refuses to permit recovery in tort for
damage resulting from reliance upon false statements of belief, of con
ditions to exist in the future, or of matters promissory in nature."
Laughery v. Central Trust Company, 258 Mass. 172, 175 (1927) (and
cases cited therein). However, recent decisions of the Massachusetts
Appeals Court have tempered this broad statement of the law and
have applied the now familiar rule that "where parties to the transac
tion are not on equal footing but where one has or should have supe
rior knowledge concerning the matters to which the representations
relate," representations as to future events may be actionable. Gopen
v. American Supply Company, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Mass.
App. 1980); Cellucci v. Sun Oil Company, 320 N.E.2d 919, 924 (Mass .
. App. 1974) (both cases citing Williston, Contracts, § 1496, at 373-74
(3d ed. 1970)).
Cellucci involved an action for specific performance of a land sale

PERFORMANCE CLAIMS

1985]

565

contract on a promissory estoppel theory, and the particular misrepre
sentations at issue related to the legal significance of the execution of a
written agreement and the likelihood of its future acceptance by a cen
tral office. 320 N.E.2d at 924-5. In Gopen, an attorney representing
both a parent corporation and its subsidiary represented to a lessor
that the subsidiary corporation would have a net worth of $25,000.00.
In reliance on this false representation, the lessor entered into a lease
with the subsidiary corporation. Finding that the extent of the assets
of the subsidiary "was a matter susceptible of actual knowledge and
was not a matter of opinion," 407 N.E.2d 1255, the court held the
representation as to future net worth actionable. Id.
Literally read, the allegations made by Black do not seem to bring
this case within the scope of the holdings of Cellucci or Gopen. In
deed, the claim alleged appears to be no more than a redundant effort
to recover in tort for breach of contract, for the specific misrepresenta
tions set forth closely relate to the performance contemplated by the
August Agreements. See, e.g., Earman Oil Company v. Burroughs
Corporation, supra, at 1244, n.lO (and cases cited therein). On the
other hand, when read in light of the evidence brought forward by
Black in resisting Burroughs' motion, the allegations take on a differ
ent qUality.
As a company engaged in the sale of computer systems, Bur
roughs must be considered to have superior knowledge about available
hardware and software and their capabilities. While'it is true that the
future performance of obligations under a contract is often a matter of
conjecture at the time written agreements are execu·ted, misrepresent
ing one's own ability to perform, that is, inducing a party to enter into
a contract by claiming the present ability to perform certain obliga
tions, may rise to the level of fraudulent misrepresentation actionable
in tort. Although the question is concededly close, at this juncture I
am persuaded that material fact issues remain as to whether Bur
roughs induced Black to enter into the August Agreements by falsely
representing to Black that Burroughs had the present ability to design,
create, deliver, and install the sophisticated computer system sought
by Black. Therefore, I will adopt the Magistrate's Recommendation
and deny Burroughs' motion for summary judgment as to Count II of
Black's complaint.
C.

Chapter 93A

Under M.G.L. c. 93A, § 11, "Any person who engages in the
conduct of any trade or commerce who suffers any loss of money or
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property, real or personal . . ." as a result of an unfair method of
competition or unfair and deceptive act or practice declared unlawful
by M.G.L. c. 93A § 2, may recover damages therefor, including
double and treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs in accordance
with the provisions of § 11. M.G.L. c. 93A § 2 provides as follows:
(a)

Unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts
and practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
hereby declared unlawful.
(b) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing paragraph
(a) of this section in actions brought . . . ,the courts will be
guided by the interpretation given by the Federal Trade Com
mission and the Federal Courts to section 5(a)(1) of the Fed
eral Trade Commission Act, as from time to time amended.
(c) The attorney general may make rules, and regulations inter
preting the provisions of subsection 2(a) of this chapter.

Id.
In its complaint, and subsequently in answers to interrogatories,
Black relies on the following regulation of the Massachusetts Attorney
General promulgated pursuant to M.G.L. c. 93A § 2:
An act or practice is a violation of M.G.L. c. 93A § 2 if
Any person or other legal entity subject to this act fails to disclose
to a buyer or prospective buyer any fact, the disclsoure of which
may have it;tfluenced the prospective buyer not to enter into the
transaction.

940 Code of Massachusetts Regulations ("C.M.R.") § 3.16 (1980).
Notwithstan~ing Burroughs' contentions that the record fails to
substantiate the non-disclosure of any "fact" to Black, my review of
the record convinces me that genuine issues of material fact remain
with respect to the merits of Black's claim under Chapter 93A in
Count III of its complaint. M.G.L. c. 93A is "a statute of broad im
pact which creates new substantive rights and provides new proce
dural devices for the enforcement those rights." Slaney v. Westwood
Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 766, 772 (Mass. 1975), and the "statutory
words '[u]nfair and deceptive practices [in M.G.L. c. 93A, § 2] are not
limited by traditional tort and contract law requirements.''' Id. at 773
quoting Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1974).
Deposition testimony submitted by Black clearly presents fact issues
as to the conduct of Burroughs in the negotiation and performance of
its written agreements with Black.
Burroughs has argued that it is exempt from the application of
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Chapter 93A by virtue of M.G.L. c. 93A § 3(1)(b) which provides as
follows:
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to . . . trade or commerce of
any person of whose gross revenue at twenty percent is derived from
transactions in interstate commerce, excepting however transactions
which (i) occur primarily and substantially within the
[C]ommonwealth [of Massachusetts] . . . .

Id. Burroughs has submitted the affidavits of two of its officers8 which
state that over twenty percent of Burroughs' gross revenue is derived
from transactions in interstate commerce, and that the computer hard
ware delivered to Black was manufactured in Pennsylvania. Notwith
standing these affidavits, I am in agreement with Black that at the very
least a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the instant
transaction occurred primarily and substantially within Massachu
setts. 9 Furthermore, I find Burroughs' reliance on the choice of law
provisions of the AES and SSA forms as exempting it from Chapter
93A misplaced. Chapter 93A applies to the actions of contracting par
ties beyond the performance of the transaction's written agreements,
and a standard form's choice of law provision concerning what law
will govern the "interpretation, validity, and effect" of an agreement is
insufficient to bar the applicability of Chapter 93A to the conduct of
parties otherwise within its scope.
Therefore, I will adopt the Recommendation of the Magistrate
denying Burroughs' motion for summary judgment' as to Black's
claims against it under Chapter 93A in Count III of the complaint.
Black has moved to amend its complaint by adding an additional
Count IV for negligent misrepresentation and by increasing the
amount of damages alleged in' the three existing counts. Black has also
moved to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of filing six addi
tional interrogatories and a request for production of documents.
Black states that its motion to amend is the result of deposition analy
ses. Burroughs has objected to both motions.
Once a responsive pleading has been filed, a complaint may be
amended only by leave of court or with the written consent of adverse
. parties. F.R. Civ. P. 15(a). Leave of court is to be given freely when
justice so requires, id., and, as the Supreme Court has explained, ab
sent "any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith
or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
8. See Affidavit of Thomas E. GarvaIe, Controller of Burroughs Corporation; Affida
vit of Jacob F. Vigil, Corporate Director of Engineering of Burroughs Corporation.
9. See Affidavit of Lewis A. Black, at 2-3.
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deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of
amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be
'freely given.''' Farnan v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). While I am
inclined to question why "deposition analyses" prompted a motion to
amend almost three years after the filing of the complaint in this case,
I cannot say that plaintiffs motion is so tardy as to amount to "undue
delay." Furthermore, inasmuch as the allegations of the proposed
Count IV closely relate to the existing counts of plaintiffs complaint, I
do not find that undue prejudice will result to the opposing party by
virtue of allowance of the amendment. See generally 3 Moore's Fed
eral Practice ~~ 15.08, 15.10 (1980). Thus, I will allow Black to
amend its complaint by adding an additional Count IV and by increas
ing the amount of damages sought under Counts II and III. Inasmuch
as I am today allowing Burroughs' motion for summary judgment on
Count I of the complaint, Black's motion to amend by increasing the
damages sought under that count will be denied.
With respect to Black's motion to reopen discovery, I note that
the date for the close of discovery has previously been extended in this
case, and that I entered an Order on November 30, 1979 extending
discovery until February 20, 1980 with the specific admonition that no
further extensions would be allowed. In its memorandum in support
of its motion to reopendiscovery, Black states the following: "without
a clear showing of prejudice to the Defendant, and with the Plaintiff
having demonstrated a particularized need for additional discovery, as
can be perceived from the plain language of the Document Request
and Interrogatories, it is urged the interest of substantial justice would
be served by the discovery order being amended so as to permit the
said Plaintiff to obtain the material requested in its discovery re
quests." Plaintiffs Memorandum at 4. The short answer to this argu
ment is that substantial justice is equally well served by counsel's
timely and diligent attention to the development of a case. The sub
stance of the matters sought to be explored in plaintiffs proposed in
terrogatories and document requests is hardly new; rather. the
information sought should have been the subject of plaintiffs discov
ery efforts from the outset. Absent compelling circumstances, and
there are none here, a motion to reopen discovery filed well over a year
and a half after the close of discovery should be, and will be, denied.
CONCLUSION
With respect to Burroughs' objections to the Magistrate's Recom
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mendation, because I have concluded thatthere are no genuine issues
as to any material fact and that Burroughs is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Count I of plaintifrs complaint, I will reject the Rec
ommendation of the Magistrate and enter summary judgment for Bur
roughs on Count I; however, because I find that there are genuine
issues of material fact with respect to Counts II and III of Black's
complaint, I will accept the Recommendation of the Magistrate deny
ing Burroughs' motion as to these two counts. Furthermore, I will
allow Black's motion to amend its complaint by adding a new Count
IV and by increasing the damages sought under Counts II and III, but
will deny plaintifrs motion to reopen discovery.
An appropriate order shall issue.
Frank H. Freedman
United States District Judge

ORDER
December 18, 1981
FREEDMAN, D.J.
This case came before me on the objections of defendant Bur
roughs Corporation to the Findings and Recommendation of a Magis
trate that its motion for summary judgment be denied; and on the
motion of plaintiff Samuel Black Company to amend its complaint and
to reopen discovery. Having reviewed de novo those portions of the
Magistrate's Recommendation to which objection has been made, and
having considered the factual record in this case, the memoranda of
counsel, and the pertinent authorities, and for the reasons set forth in
the Memorandum entered this date, I have determined as follows:
1) That the Magistrate's Recommendation should be, and hereby
is, REJECTED, with respect to Count I of plaintifrs com
plaint, and summary judgment should be, and hereby is, AL
LOWED with respect to this count.
2) That the Magistrate's Recommendation should be, and hereby
is, ACCEPTED with respect to Counts II and III of plaintiff's
complaint, and summary judgment is DENIED as to these
counts.
3) That plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint should be, and
hereby is, ALLOWED with respect to Counts II, III, and IV.
4) That plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint should be, and
hereby is, DENIED with respect to Count I.
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5) That plaintitrs motion to reopen discovery should be, and
hereby is, DENIED.

Summary judgment for the defendant Burroughs Corporation on
Count I of the complaint of plaintiff Samuel Black Company.
It is so ORDERED.
Frank H. Freedman
United States District Court Judge

